Peace Agreements and Civil Wars in Africa: Insurgent Motivations, State Responses, and Third Party Peacemaking in Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone
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Peace Agreements and Civil Wars in Africa: Insurgent Motivations, ...

Chapter 1:  Peace Agreements and Conflict Dynamics
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The fear that peace negotiations would demoralize one’s army, while undermining general domestic support, often leads governments to reject negotiations. This is the reason generally cited for America’s rejection of U Thant’s attempts to arrange for peace negotiations to end the Vietnam War.58

“Devious Objectives” and Peace Agreements

Even if an interested mediator is able to mediate a compromise solution, one party in the conflict may find it convenient not to go along with it because of what Oliver Richmond describes as “devious objectives” in mediation processes. According to this view, disputants in a conflict become involved in a mediation process to improve upon their prospects, but not necessarily in terms of a compromise solution with the adversary.59 From this perspective, the disputants may value the assets and resources the mediator brings to the conflict more than the search for a compromise solution to end the war. Richmond further points out that the disputants may have particular roles in mind for the mediator. These may include viewing the mediator as an agent of the legitimization of their objectives and positions, as an agent of empowerment, as an ally, or as a channel of internationalization of the conflict.60 This may result in a continuation of the dispute at a lower level.

For the government side, the difficulty of accepting an outside mediator stems from the perception that such a move raises the possibility of the recognition of the rebel claims. It is therefore common for the government to reject mediation initiatives since such a move is likely to empower the rebels. For the rebels, however, the prospect of a mediator intervening is welcome, as this would empower them. Rebels may, however, be concerned with whether the rebellion has any chance of being viewed as internationally acceptable and not contravening any of the norms of the international system.61 This problem becomes significant if the mediator is associated with the UN, as the third party will have the interest of the UN Charter in mind during the mediation process.62