| Chapter 1: | Peace Agreements and Conflict Dynamics |
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In short, Stedman concludes that the danger a spoiler poses to a peace agreement depends on two conditions: the position of the spoiler and the type of spoiler.
Position of the Spoiler
On the basis of location, two types of spoilers are differentiated: an insider and an outsider. An inside spoiler participates in the peace process, signs the agreement, and signals support for the implementation of the settlement, but later fails to fulfill important provisions of the agreement. Inside spoilers sign peace agreements for tactical reasons because they want the peace process to move forward as long as it holds the likelihood that they will achieve their aims. In other words, inside spoilers need to show minimum compliance to the other parties—just enough to convince everyone else that the process is well on track—but they will seek to maintain their advantages and will be sensitive to actions that are likely to weaken their military capability.69
In contrast, outside spoilers are parties who exclude themselves from the peace process because they feel that the agreement does not meet their demands, or that they are excluded by the other parties because they hold incompatible preferences. They are not a party to the agreement and publicly declare their hostility to it. They use open violence to undermine the agreement, which includes kidnappings, assassinating moderate leaders, massacring civilians, killing peacekeepers, and threatening and taking hostage foreign nationals.70
Type of the Spoiler
The likelihood of a peace agreement holding also depends on the goals the spoiler seeks. Accordingly, spoilers can have limited (positive-sum) or total (zero-sum) goals. Limited spoilers seek limited goals; they may seek recognition of their demands, amnesty from prosecution for their leaders, or an expanded role in the postwar political regime. Total spoilers, in contrast, seek total goals; they pursue power to the exclusion of other groups, hold nonnegotiable preferences, and are not sensitive to costs incurred in the conflict.