Peace Agreements and Civil Wars in Africa: Insurgent Motivations, ...

1.4. Third Parties In Civil War Agreements

Third parties play a number of important roles in peace agreements. These actions usually range in order of involvement from less coercive tactics—as applying diplomatic pressure on the warring parties—to mediation, economic sanctions, arms embargoes, peacekeeping and military intervention, and imposing a peace settlement on the parties. The importance of third-party mediation in peace agreements has been noted by Dietrich, who points out that an increasing number of recent wars have been ended by third-party mediation rather than through one party’s victory and the other side’s defeat. Thus, from a total number of 196 wars in the 1945–1996 period, Dietrich finds that only 17 percent of these wars ended with victory by the initiator, while in 26 percent of these cases, the defenders repulsed the aggression. In contrast, 40 percent of wars were ended by third-party mediation.³ The attributes of the third party that explain whether its actions will succeed in conflict resolution are its leverage, interests, and impartiality, as well as the strategies of mediation.

Third Party as Mediator

Leverage in Mediation

The mediator can use its leverage over warring parties to secure a peace agreement. Leverage—defined by Touval and Zartman as arguments and inducements that make unattractive proposals look attractive⁴—is indispensable to mediation success. This importance is reflected in the fact that parties in conflict are only likely to accept third-party mediation if the mediator is perceived as able and willing to help them reach an agreement. This observation supports the proposition that the more “goods” a mediator has that it is prepared to commit to a mediation process, the more likely it can pressure the parties for a compromise solution. This is confirmed in Daniel Frei’s study, which demonstrates that states or groups receiving or depending on external aid are more likely to accept mediation than states that do not.⁵

Touval and Zartman see leverage as coming from three sources: first, from the parties’ need for a solution that the mediator can provide; second, from the parties’ susceptibility to shifting weight that the mediator can apply; and finally, from the parties’ interest in side payments that the mediator can either offer (“carrots”) or withhold (“sticks”).⁶