Peace Agreements and Civil Wars in Africa: Insurgent Motivations, State Responses, and Third Party Peacemaking in Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone
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Peace Agreements and Civil Wars in Africa: Insurgent Motivations, ...

Chapter 1:  Peace Agreements and Conflict Dynamics
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It is important to note that each of these sources of mediator leverage lies with the warring parties’ perceptions of the outcome of the conflict—a characteristic that increases the difficulty of a compromise solution, especially in intrastate conflicts. Moreover, each of these sources of leverage presents unique obstacles to the mediators’ search for a solution to the conflict.

The first source of leverage—the warring parties’ desire for a solution— is the most important source because without it, mediation cannot even be initiated. However, it is more difficult to apply this form of leverage when a power disparity is significant between the disputing parties. Touval and Zartman point out that this is because, while the weaker party may desire a mediation solution to the conflict, the more powerful party may want to achieve a military victory. In the second source—the susceptibility of the mediator to shifting weight in favor of, or against, either of the disputants—the difficulty arises from two related factors: the mediator’s ability to shift weight and the parties’ sensitivity to that shift.7 The mediator must help to maintain the balance between the warring parties in a way that would lead to a stalemate. The stalemate, in turn, would lead the parties to desire a compromise solution.

The last source of leverage involves the use of side payments as inducements to compromise, and as a catalyst to bring the disputants to the negotiating table. If used carefully, inducements can help the mediator move the process forward. Touval and Zartman, however, further point out that using inducements as a leveraging tactic has two inherent disadvantages: first, using inducements may require a long-term commitment of the mediator to the warring parties, and second, inducements may not be a major source of leverage throughout the process, and even at the end, their use may be limited.

Mediator Interests

According to Touval and Zartman, mediators who have strong interests in resolving a conflict are more likely to succeed than those who do not. These interests are of two categories: mediation as self-defense, and mediation as a desire to extend and increase influence.8