The Constitution, Race, and Renewed Relevance of Original Intent: ...

The fugitive-slave controversy effectively heightened northern awareness of the reality that slavery implicated the entire nation rather than just a particular region. Even if a slave was apprehended and returned, his or her economic value was diminished by the act of running away and by the consequently disclosed risk of future escape. The fugitive-slave issue thus acquired significant political meaning. For the South, it represented a test of the federal government’s willingness to accommodate and later support slavery. For the North, it illuminated and and clarified the entire nation’s entanglement with society. In reality, slavery was a significant economic benefit to the entire nation as capital formation was enhanced by the South’s cheap labor pool.

Fugitive-slave legislation, more visibly than its constitutional predicate, directly implicated the federal government in the cause of slavery. The Constitution’s fugitive-slave clause provided that

The provision was set forth in article 4, which concerns interstate relations, rather than in article 1, which delineates the powers of Congress. Because it also did not have an explicit implementation provision, like the Full Faith and Credit clause in the same article, a credible argument was that it provided no authority for a congressional enactment.¹² Although the clause became the basis for intense controversy, its original purpose is uncertain. The clause was drafted and adopted without debate or formal vote as the convention was winding down. Not surprisingly, given its vagueness and the relative inattention afforded it, the fugitive-slave clause was a source of diverging interpretations ranging from the sense that it established a right of recovery anywhere in the nation to the perception that it simply precluded another state’s emancipation of runaway slaves.¹³ The observation has been made that, during the framing process, no one “could foresee a federally regulated Fugitive Slave Law with marshals and special commissioners.”¹⁴ Soon after ratification, however, Congress enacted legislation that enshrined the clause as a predicate for affirmative federal support of slavery.