The Study of China in Universities: A Comparative Case Study of A ...

This could mean that by adopting such assumptions, there were two implications for my research: (a) there is no fixed meaning of the realm in Chinese studies; and (b) the account of the findings of social phenomena in this study would be, according to the nature of symbolic interactionism, reinterpreted in time and would depend upon the definitions of the significant others whose interaction constitutes its meaning (Plummer, 1991).

One might argue that if things are constructed—as in the position that I have adopted—it means nothing actually exists but that all is constructed. If so, it might also be argued that no reality actually exists, including the existence of China or Britain. Furthermore, as the second stage of this book consists of a comparative study, this then raises epistemological issues that need to be clarified. For example, one could argue that this study, on the one hand, adopts interpretive constructivism, which assumes that social phenomena are constructed and are in a constant state of revision or may not exist. On the other hand, the study also constitutes a comparative study which presupposes that (a) China, Britain, and Australia exist and (b) there are social phenomena relevant to this study which do exist and can be found and investigated. By presupposing these two, one is subscribing, albeit unconsciously, to the belief of the objectivity of reality, as realists have argued. This duality appears to be self-contradictory.

My defense to such critiques is, first, that the findings of the social phenomena in this study are, indeed, likely to be reinterpreted and may not exist after its completion. As Mannheim has argued, cultural phenomena are not something fixed and knowledge of them is not something static, always remaining the same. Second, I disagree with the postulation that there is a contradiction, on the one hand, in viewing the world as constructed and, on the other, in assuming the existence of a social reality that exists and can be grasped and investigated. I argue for the coexistence of realism and constructionism. But the possibilities of the aforementioned critiques put me in a position that suggests some clarification is needed as to the type of constructionism that I have adopted.