Corruption in Tanzania: The Case for Circumstantial Evidence By ...

If the scholar is a political scientist, the analysis of corruption is likely to address the question of the legitimacy of the state. For a banker, the emphasis will be on the effects corruption has on investment. An economist would tie corruption to the downside of economic inefficiency. For an administrator, the emphasis will be on rules and regulations, while a lawyer’s focus will be on the legal framework. Similarly, a sociologist will focus on the social context of corruption, and so on.

1.2.1. A Survey of the Problem in Tanzania

The Warioba Report⁹ mapped the problem and magnitude of corruption in Tanzania and drew the conclusion that corruption has permeated all sectors and is therefore a serious issue that deserves special attention for its crippling effects on the economy, social fabric, and political legitimacy. The Warioba Report resulted in the formulation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan (NACSAP). Anticorruption measures are also addressed in and linked to the Poverty Reduction Strategy of Tanzania, and corruption is identified as one of the impoverishing factors in Tanzania; thus, good governance constitutes the third of the three clusters of outcomes in the Poverty Reduction Strategy (MKUKUTA). (The Tanzanian government Poverty Reduction Strategy (MKUKUTA), has three clusters: Cluster 1 focuses on macroeconomic growth and stability, Cluster 2 seeks to institute sustainable reforms that addresses the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and Cluster 3 encompasses good governance and the fight against corruption.) Several researchers and scholars have emphasised that the structural characteristic of political markets in which there is little incentive for control by the voters and strong incentives for self-serving politicians to cater to interest groups is the principal factor in corruption.¹⁰

Surveys show that corruption is pervasive in areas that lack economic freedom; overexpanded and overregulatory governmental structures create incentives for corruption by encouraging the seeking of privileges. On the one hand, corruption is the cost of obtaining privileges that only the state can legally grant. Such privileges would include favouritism in taxation, tariffs, subsidies, loans, government contracting, and regulation.¹¹ On the other hand, corruption is the result of attempts to avoid the restrictions that accompany the use of privileges, taxes, and barriers to free trade.¹²