| Chapter 1: | Derrida’s Ethics of “Irresponsibilization”; or, How to Get Irresponsible, in Two Easy Lessons |
around, in extraordinary arabesques or flourishes, what Kierkegaard says in Fear and Trembling:
The reader will note that Derrida’s thinking here, like Kierkegaard’s, depends on a kind of super-Protestantism. Derrida insists on the absolute singularity of each person, his or her incommensurability with any other person, and therefore his or her eternal inscrutability or secrecy. Each person is “exceptional or extraordinary”, therefore inconceivable, unthinkable, and, strictly speaking, unspeakable. That is because language deals in concepts and generalities, whereas “absolute responsibility” has to do with “uniqueness, absolute singularity, hence nonsubstitution, nonrepetition, silence, and secrecy” (Gift of Death 61). Ordinary language involves the possibility of substitution and repetition. Any apple can in speech be substituted for any other apple, and each apple


