| Chapter 1: | Introduction |
The issue confronting both Mukasey and the vice admiral was a central quandary of modern counterterrorism in both military and domestic law enforcement operations: how to assert control over a terrorist suspect in order to get the information needed to understand the enemy, discover the truth, and stop the next attack. A central aspect of that dilemma is the fact that the need for intelligence and/or usable evidence requires governments to not simply kill terrorists―but to capture them so that information may be gleaned (for the intelligence officer) and evidence collected (for the prosecutor). Otherwise stated, rather than simply crushing the rattlesnake when it is poised to strike, governments must instead find a way to ensnare it in order to obtain needed intelligence, convict terrorist suspects, and prevent future terrorist attacks.
This is true whether one is seeking to thwart terrorists at home or on the battlefield abroad. As Jacoby noted, interrogation is important for military reasons, such as developing information needed to counter the “asymmetrical” threat posed by terrorists.8 It is pellucidly clear, however, that such information is equally essential to civilian criminal institutions in their effort to ferret out terrorist operations domestically and prosecute offenders. In either case, it is axiomatic that, in order to accomplish such interrogation, one must first detain a person so that he or she can be interrogated. There can be no doubt that if interrogation forms a critical part of the counterterrorism effort, detention is its necessary antecedent.
This challenge is certainly one that is shared by other countries. The threat posed by terrorist activity is a matter of utmost concern to modern governments across the globe.9 The sickening brutality demonstrated by international terrorists in New York, Madrid, London, and elsewhere has mobilized action by those governments on both the domestic and