| Chapter 1: | Myth and Theory |
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Therefore, it is in accordance with this sound principle that this book begins the process of an exploration of the mythic structure of medieval Europe by focusing on an area largely restricted to medieval Wales. Once more, this is in accordance with the sound principles set forth by Lévi-Strauss, for in The Raw and the Cooked, which as his first volume on the myths of the Americas is analogous to this work, he clearly outlined the procedure for beginning such an exploration: ‘I shall take as my starting point one myth, originating from one community. Gradually broadening the field of inquiry, I shall then move on to myths from neighbouring societies’ (Lévi-Strauss 1994, 1).
This is exactly the procedure that is followed in this analysis, with the exception that the broadening of the material is undertaken even more gradually than it is in Lévi-Strauss’ own work. In taking such a cautious approach, the study aims to be able to clearly explicate the structure and show how the mythological sets that Lévi-Strauss demonstrated on a grand scale can also be found on a smaller scale in a far more focused study.35
In addition to establishing the parameters of this research in relation to the scope and ambition of Lévi-Strauss’ work, the previous discussion has clearly shown that, for Lévi-Strauss, myths were useful in establishing a particularly anthropological historical record of the Americas prior to the commencement of European records.36 Given the centrality of history in this discussion, it is perhaps hard to see why so many commentators have sided with Wolf in suggesting that Lévi-Strauss proposed the existence of people without history (Hugh-Jones 1988, 139). Gow has suggested that this confusion arises from a misunderstanding of Lévi-Strauss’ notion of ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ cultures and what he meant by myth acting to obliterate time (2001, 14–19).
The notion of ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ cultures is perhaps one of the most reported elements of Lévi-Strauss’ thought, but despite that fact, the discussion of this division only forms a small part of his total published work. Any attempt to make definitive statements about the division are further inhibited by Lévi-Strauss’ caveat that the types are ideal rather than actual (1977, 256). Nevertheless, it is broadly possible to say that,