Handbook of Prejudice By Anton Pelinka, Karin Bischof, and Karin ...

Bercovitch has moved here from an exclusive theory of ideology (criticising what “they” do) to an inclusive theory of ideology (describing what “we” do). While the term ideology has more or less disappeared from the critical analytic vocabulary, prejudice seems to have taken its place. To give an example: politicians who abhor the “destruction” of beautiful scenery by the erection of wind generators denounce this development by asserting that it is based on an “ecological prejudice”. Wherever there is a collision of views and arguments, the argument of the opponent is likely to be labelled as an irrational prejudice. In critical discourse, the term ideology and the question of “true or false” were suspended on the assumption that all philosophical views and political systems are “culturally constructed”. We have, however, to reinstate the critical paradigm when we are faced with the detrimental and devastating effects of some of these constructions on others. This is where the term prejudice enters the critical discourse. It is targeted as a generator of heterostereotypes which produce oppressive social practices ranging from discrimination, exploitation, and segregation, all the way to genocide. These heterostereotypes are legitimised and maintained by an image that exaggerates the difference between self and other while it raises the self-image and lowers the image of the other or the out-group. The function of such an image is to cement power relations of inequality or fuel the hatred that is needed to prepare or enter a war.

There are various characteristics of prejudices to be discussed. Two have already been mentioned: their instrumental function to create unequal power structures and their incorrigibility. Three others must be mentioned here: their tendency towards exaggeration, their mass dissemination, and their ineradicability. It is generally acknowledged