Corruption and American Politics By Michael A. Genovese and Vict ...

“perceptions matter” and a “problem of trust…now plagues the American polity.” This has, he argues, a corrosive effect on citizens' attitudes. But is the perception correct? In answering this question, Warren tries to broaden our definition of what a democratic system counts as corruption and in doing so asks us to consider “corruption of the democratic process” as the most damaging form of political corruption.

Political philosopher John Parrish asks the provocative question: Is corruption ever justified? Parrish compels us to think in a deeper, richer, and more nuanced way, arguing that at times conduct that might normally be impermissible may nonetheless be warranted or excusable under certain situations. Parrish examines the “dirty hands” dilemma of political leadership, drawing a distinction between “dirty-handed corruption” and “internally justified corruption,” and further between three types of democratic corruption: manipulative corruption, discriminating corruption, and privative corruption.

In his chapter, “Bending the Frame to Corrupt the Lenses: An Examination of Cognitive Science and Corruption,” Wayne Le Cheminant looks at cognitive science as a way to help understand corruption. He argues that a significant aspect of corruption stems from how politicians manage the “language of corruption,” so that their acts—such as campaign finance rules—give the appearance of legitimacy. By defining (framing) corruption for us, politicians legitimate their other acts that given a different framing might well be considered corrupt.

Three essays focusing on the institutional aspects of corruption follow. My own contribution focuses on presidential corruption, and attempts to examine the major cases of executive corruption across American history. I focus on what generally are considered the most corrupt administrations in history—Grant, Harding, Nixon, Reagan, and Clinton—and attempt to determine the chief causes of corruption, how involved the president was in the corruption, and if the means for controlling corruption are adequate to the task.

In James A. Thurber's chapter, he, like Michael Johnston, wonders if we aren't looking in the wrong place when we focus on lobbyists' use of money in Congress. He argues that there are scandals of a more