| Chapter 1: | Democracy without Politics? Hidden Costs of Corruption and Reform in America |
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up unsatisfied with the reforms it enacts and persuaded that democratic values and public life are corrupted in fundamental ways. The connections lie both in our conceptions of reform and the sorts of corruption we experience.
In other contexts26 I have characterized American-style corruption as an example of “influence market” corruption. By that I mean that well-financed wealth interests, seeking influence within relatively strong and autonomous public institutions, find it useful to buy or rent influence and access from political figures who, in turn, are in the market to turn an easy buck. Such scenarios do not occur in every case, but they are the predominant sort of corruption in relatively democratic, well-institutionalized systems where wealth is relatively plentiful. The striking thing about most such corrupt deals is that, as noted, they have the intent and/or effect of decreasing competition: private interests paying for influence and access get a jump on their economic competitors, while political figures who take in the most funding solidify their positions against their own challengers. That is true both in the case of bribes and extortion. It is at least equally true of an activity that does the most to foster citizen perceptions of pervasive corruption: fully legal campaign contributions.
While the overwhelming majority of campaign contributions do not fit most analytical definitions of corruption, they are the focus of corruption grievances that classical thinkers would easily recognize. Leaders are seen as remote and uncaring, citizens question the fundamental integrity of politics, and the political system has increasing problems encouraging and obtaining loyalty and commitment. Publicly revealed flows of funding and the fact that campaigns promising “change” seem, if anything, to reinforce the status quo contribute to such perceptions. But so, ironically, do many of our reforms.
For example, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), as amended at many points since it took effect in 1971, was presented to the public as a way to check corruption and to produce more responsive government. The basic strategy was not to provide resources for more open and vigorous political competition, but rather to place comprehensive controls on political money—trusting, in effect, that imposing a ceiling