Chapter 1: | Distinctions: Observation, Meaning, and the Reduction of Complexity |
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Whitehead's query about why the word-symbol for “tree” should indicate a tree (and not the other way around) is stirring because it evokes the paradox of an unresolved binary distinction. There is no a priori information or ontology available to determine what should be indicated or selected. The paradox can only be resolved when an observing system indicates one or the other side according to its own self-constructed information. When it comes to attaching symbols and objects in the world, there is the possibility to observe society, and to inform and constrain one's own use of symbols with society's references. It takes an observer to perceive a tree (to see the object standing before them). Perceiving others also confronted by the tree, an observer may come to expect that others will identify the tree as such, and also expect others will share this same expectation in return. The reciprocity of this expectation depends, however, on the self-reference of society providing names for the objects perceived by observers. Without society's interference, an observer could not call a tree by any name.
Observers
As the sociologist Stephan Fuchs maintained, the world contains no information, only unstructured complexity. Any information that makes a difference for an observer is the self-made product of the observer (Fuchs 2001:17–18). Thus, every whimsical observation made by an observer, every self-referential link between a symbol and a meaning, can provide information about that observer. Fuchs pointed out,
Information about an observer may be used reflexively by the same system, with self-observation leading to “self-understanding.” Such information might also be of interest to another observing system, leading to “knowledge of the other.” “Observations,” Fuchs suggested, “always tell