| Chapter 2: | From Confl ict Protraction to Peace Actualization in Palestinian-Israeli Relations |
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Palestinian and Israeli Peacemakers
Mainstream national leaders on both sides of the Palestinian-Israeli divide are substantially to blame for conflict protraction. It is actually problematic to call some of them peacemakers. They speak of peace but few practice it or are serious about it. These leaders, with the overwhelming majority being males, have historically made decisions based on narrow self- or party interests (e.g., retaining their power and offices through manipulation of their constituents' emotions), zero-sum games, or a we-versus-them mentality. Once their decisions are carried out, more often than not, the process has taken on a life of its own, diminishing national community goals and neglecting peace-building approaches. They have consistently misperceived or actually ignored the other's goals and interests, both during and after conflict.
In emphasizing security or violence, peacemakers have failed to realize that such strategies endanger others through insecurity and counterviolence, fueling passions that lead to communal guilt, collective punishment, and revenge, rather than due process. The general population has either become a proponent of the party line or has dutifully followed it, often out of fear, psychological numbing, or national acculturation. Some have chosen to emigrate or go into self-imposed exile. Those able have joined the peace builders' camps, preferring to engage in the public peace process or in addressing community-based and functional issues. Their motivation has been to hasten peace and to set a solid foundation for peace once a peace treaty is signed.
Serious peacemaking initiatives in Arab-Israeli history (of which the question of Palestine has always been central) and Palestinian-Israeli relations have been few and have occurred at the highest levels. Successes have come when those involved have been willing to move from a hard-line toward a soft-line mindset or from a hard-line or a soft-line toward the middle. Prime examples include Anwar Sadat's rapprochement with Israel between 1977 and 1981, the Oslo Peace Accords of September 1993, and the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty of October 1994. Failure has occurred when leaders have been reluctant to seize the