Women and the Democratic Party: The Evolution of EMILY's List By ...

however, party strength declined and interest groups blossomed, fed in part by the institutionalization of social movements (Ornstein and Elder 1978).

One of the key things many of these groups did was to lobby the government. The effectiveness of lobbying efforts varied; what the group could offer politicians often determined the success of the movement. For instance, groups affiliated with the liberal women's movement or civil rights movement offered government officials a much-needed constituency (Costain 1992, 14), whereas other organizations such as business interests and unions, gained access and influence because of their deep pockets. When campaigns became candidate-centered and campaign consultants became a separate entity, “the burden of raising campaign money passed from party to candidate and the fat cats became as important to candidates as they had been for the parties” (Souraf 1992, 3).

The skyrocketing costs of campaigns—from $200 million in 1964 to $425 million in 1972—reignited earlier concerns about special interests and led to the passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act (hereafter, FECA) in 1971.² Yet FECA did not stop President Nixon from extorting upward of $30 million from corporate executives during the 1972 presidential campaign (Sabato 1984, 5). In response, starting in 1974, Congress passed a series of amendments to FECA to stem the tide of money involved in campaigns and elections. These amendments largely focused on limiting the contributions of wealthy individuals, or “fat cats,” whom most considered the major problem in the system (Souraf 1992, 9).³ Not only did the 1974 amendments fail to stop the flow of money into electoral politics, but the newly amended law “…ignored or overlooked the two emerging developments that would push reform off course,” namely candidate spending and PACs (Souraf 1992, 11–12).