| Chapter 1: | Introduction |
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fertility via two routes: (a) directly, by imposing sanctions on the practice of birth control or legitimizing the practice of less effective methods only, or (b) indirectly, by indoctrinating its followers with a moral and social philosophy of marriage and family that emphasizes the virtues of reproduction (McQuillan, 2004; Westoff, 1959).
Third, substantial religious differentials in fertility have been empirically documented in a large number of countries even in early 1960s. For example, Yaukey (1961) in Lebanon; Rizk (1963) in Egypt; Matras (1973) in Israel; Mazur (1967) in the Soviet Union; Rizk (1973) in Jordon; Sinha (1957) in India; Caldwell (1968) in tropical Africa; and Kirk (1967) in Malaysia, Albania, and Yugoslavia all have found significantly higher fertility rates for Muslims than for non-Muslims.
In the West, religious affiliation has also been found to have significant effect on fertility. In Europe, Canada, the United States, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, studies have shown that Catholics have higher fertility than non-Catholics (Chou & Brown, 1968; Glass, 1968; Nixon, 1963; Ryder & Westoff, 1971). Studies conducted in Western societies suggest that Catholics have higher fertility than Jews or Protestants, with Jews having the lowest fertility of the three groups (McQuillan, 1999).
There have, however, been puzzling exceptions to this pattern. For instance, Yaukey (1961) noted similar fertility levels for Muslims and Christians in rural areas of Lebanon. Rizk (1963) also reported similar findings in rural Egypt. Busia (1954) noted no differences between Muslim and Christian fertility in Ghana; similar results were found in Bangladesh (Ahmed, 1986). Driver (1963) discovered no significant differences between Muslim and Hindu fertility in India; however, more recent studies showed that Muslim women tend to have higher fertility compared with