Jockeying for the American Presidency: The Political Opportunism ...

“ambition theoretic” incentive (“the combination of policy concerns…and the actions of ambitious politicians seeking political careers”) preceded the “social choice” incentive (“the goal of attaining policy majorities…[and] maintaining such majorities” in the legislature) in American history. In other words, not long after the Constitution was ratified and George Washington was inaugurated as the first president, ambitious politicians were already contemplating their own paths to the presidency. Thus, Thomas Jefferson wanted to be president and began organizing his “anti-administration” party with James Madison before the Third Congress (1793–1795) began manifesting partisan behavior on roll-call votes.³³

As was suggested earlier, this research extends Galvin's argument of “presidential party building” by claiming that presidents begin “party building” (and/or “party predation”) as aspirants. Once in office, they continue to realize their partisan visions, even if that means ignoring or undermining those aspects of their party that they believe contribute to its weakness. Theoretically aligning with this research, Galvin demonstrated that the different partisan developmental trajectories since Eisenhower are related to not only “the different competitive political environments [the presidents] faced,” but also to “the different organizational arrangements they inherited from their predecessors.” He further detailed how those presidents who perceived that they were part of the minority party (i.e., the Republicans and Clinton in his second term) were particularly motivated to “change their political environment.” Again, although this account substantially supports Galvin's view of a president's relationship to his party, it nonetheless offers a couple of refinements: (1) aspirants also “build” (and “predate”) parties as he suggests, but because they have more competition (other aspirants and/or presidents), it is more difficult for them to make lasting changes; and (2) successful aspirants (nominees and presidents) possess more opportunities to institutionalize their visions for the party than losing aspirants.³⁴

Although this research sympathizes with Marty Cohen et al. about the likelihood of the party nomination process operating “now as in the past,” it also takes issue with The Party Decides regarding what happened in the