Jockeying for the American Presidency: The Political Opportunism ...

The other was from Andrew Donelson, Jackson's nephew and political aide, who emphasized the urgency of Jackson's summons. According to Borneman, Polk went to Nashville on Sunday and “probably met late into the night with Robert Armstrong. Early the next morning, the two of them rode out to the Hermitage. En route, they met Andrew Donelson…[who] returned to the Hermitage with Polk and Armstrong to confer with Old Hickory.” Having leapt onto the track, Polk began jockeying for advantage.¹¹

In the letter Polk wrote to Cave Johnson on May 13 after the meeting, Polk appropriately denied any interest in the presidential nomination and suggested that it was Jackson who thought that he should lead the ticket. Cognizant of the large number of delegates already committed and the depth of Van Buren's support among those in the North who leaned toward abolition, Polk instructed Johnson to continue backing Van Buren and push only Polk's vice presidential case. Explaining his motive, he wrote, “should Mr. Van Buren be withdrawn, his friends will probably hold the balance of power and will be able to control the nominations for both offices, and therefore the great importance in conciliating them.” In short, Polk's nomination strategy aligned his ambition with his long-held commitments as Jackson's protégé and Van Buren's supporter. This allowed Polk to simultaneously retain his allies’ favor (by appearing as though he were above factional politics) and promote his cause (as a worthy replacement). And this assisted him in garnering the two-thirds he needed because although Van Buren did not have two-thirds of the delegates, he did have a majority (about 55 percent). The remaining delegates were split among several aspirants (Lewis Cass of Michigan, James Buchanan of Pennsylvania, and Levi Woodbury of New Hampshire). Hence, Polk understood that if he could find the support of about 35 delegates and he could persuade Van Buren's delegates (around 145 delegates) to side with him because he had been loyal “up until the end,” then he could capture the convention's prize. Further, he crafted his plan to ensure that he would become the “spontaneous” choice of individual delegates from several, distant states when the deadlock arrived and they needed a compromise candidate (see note 12).