Jockeying for the American Presidency: The Political Opportunism ...

remained the same, or have notions about what constitutes an “ideal nominee” changed over time? Hence, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that much of the literature depicts aspirants as either interchangeable cogs in the party machines or media-dependent victims of circumstance. Both views are unsatisfying because they fail to explain how a few aspirants end up as nominees, whereas the majority who run—and are likely equally ambitious as those who win—do not secure the nomination. Thus, this research aims to provide a deeper understanding of presidential aspirants (character and learned abilities), the opportunities and constraints for aspirant agency (behavior and strategies) in politics, and the nature of the selection process (expectations, nuances, and changes) throughout history.⁸

Lastly, Polk's sprint provides a succinct, concrete example of many of the abstract claims made later in this study about how ambitious aspirants game systems, craft rhetoric, and design their political strategies to win, first, their party's nomination and, second, the presidency. His story of how a “dark horse” succeeds is, to some extent, the story of every successful aspirant, and it proves to be particularly relevant for those who competed prior to the modern period. Polk, therefore, serves as an exemplar of aspirant maneuvering from which to compare and contrast several of the other presidential aspirants’ attempts to ascend to the White House in this research.

James K. Polk's Sprint: April 27–May 29, 1844

Having been tossed from the Whig Party after a dispute with Senator Henry Clay and the Congress over chartering a new national bank and believing that the annexation of Texas (a policy favored but not accomplished by Jackson) would be his ticket back into the Democratic fold, President John Tyler sent a signed annexation treaty to the Senate for ratification on April 22, 1844. Unfortunately for Tyler, newly appointed Secretary of State John Calhoun of South Carolina had his own presidential ambitions and policy preferences. As such, Calhoun sent to the Senate not only the requested documents that led to the treaty's final