Jockeying for the American Presidency: The Political Opportunism ...

This research, however, differs somewhat with Aldrich on the motives driving politicians: “These politicians do not have partisan goals per se. Rather, they have more fundamental goals, and the party is the only instrument for achieving them…These goals are to be sought in government, not in the parties, but they are goals that at times have been realized through the parties.” Although it is true that the aspirants’ “goals are several and come in various combinations” (beyond winning, each holds specific ideological and policy preferences), they all aim to forge a “strong” party. Hence, they possess “fundamental goals” about their party that relate to their own beliefs about how to make it strong (i.e., the optimal organizational structure and platform—rhetorical, ideological, and policy mix—given their individual preferences). Aspirants, then, like presidents, as Daniel Galvin asserted, perceive the act of “party building” to be “both instrumental and developmental at the same time.” The consequence of this composite perspective is that it suggests that there is more cooperation among aspirants (e.g., “I'll defer now because I agree about how to strengthen the party and I'll compete later to win the party's nomination”) than either Aldrich or Schwartz permitted in their “long coalitions.” It also explains how partisan deference and loyalty—altruistic behaviors—not only exist but also flourish within a party composed of ambitious, rational politicians. In sum, whereas all aspirants want to win the presidency, most are not willing to pursue “scorched earth” strategies to win their party's nomination because they know that if they did, they would then be left in control of a “weak” party or, even worse, a divided party. Those aspirants who are shortsighted or blinded by their presidential ambition tend to lose the general election (e.g., Henry Clay in 1844, discussed in chapter 6).³²

Aldrich and Schwartz may have underestimated this partisan behavior—strategic altruism—because the conceptual starting point for their respective models is the legislative, not the executive, branch. As will be discussed in the next chapter, this study views the constitutional rules governing presidential selection as the catalyst that ignites the parties rather than the practical problems ambitious politicians faced in the new government (the “why parties”). Employing Aldrich's formulation, the