Jockeying for the American Presidency: The Political Opportunism ...

past. Rather than viewing “party leaders, associated groups, activists, and other insiders” as “the main drivers” in the nomination process, this account claims that ambitious presidential aspirants in previous eras, like Polk, have always “self-nominat[ed]” and taken part in an “invisible primary.” History reveals that aspirants have long maneuvered to engender support, and they have long promoted those individuals, factions, and interests that support them. Polk won over Butler and the other New York delegates not because they agreed with his policy agenda (many were against annexation), but because Polk had earned it. He was perceived as having been loyal to Van Buren and, by extension, the New York Democratic Party. After Van Buren withdrew, his supporters were persuaded—in heresthetical fashion—to return Polk's favor. Tugwell explained, “By 1844, no one in the party deserved better of it [the nomination] than Polk…[he demonstrates how] a willingness to build up party credit patiently may pay off.” Hence, whereas parties (as developmental institutions with established structures, precedents, and rules designed by previous aspirants—both successful ones who become a nominee and/or a president as well as the unsuccessful ones who lose) tend to resist the efforts of newly striving aspirants to change them, opportunists do not stop striving. They know well that if they do, then they will not be made the party's nominee just because some “leaders” (or “groups”) favor them in the presidential contest. There are far too many notable partisans (e.g., governors, senators, vice presidents, cabinet secretaries, and ambassadors) who would like to be named the party's presidential nominee to believe that “a group of intense policy demanders” make the decision absent aspirant opportunism. In short, “politicians” do not act as the “agents of the groups that make up the party.” When observed closely and early enough in time, it is evident that aspirants (and presidents) act as the leaders “of the groups that make up the party.”³⁵

This issue highlights the two central weaknesses with The Party Decides: (1) the historical descriptions reference few primary sources and substantially depend on secondary sources authored by political scientists (who are concerned about patterns and theories) rather than historians (who are concerned about the particulars of history), which