Jockeying for the American Presidency: The Political Opportunism of Aspirants
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Jockeying for the American Presidency: The Political Opportunism ...

Chapter :  Introduction: Presidential Aspirant James K. Polk
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them largely responsible for the changes that have been observed in each party's policy positions and ideological trajectories since their inception. In sum, evolution and development occur continuously on two levels—within each party and between the parties—owing to this fierce competition between presidential aspirants.29

Aspirants engage in these behaviors because they understand that if they become their party's presidential nominee, then they will need their party (and they need it to be strong) to win the presidency—the constitutional rules of the game necessitate it. Further, they calculate that if they succeed in shaping their party (e.g., governing coalition, rhetoric, and policy commitments), then, when the presidential election rolls around, they will be the “front-runner” or its “favorite” to receive the nomination. That is what it means to set up the situation in “heresthetical” fashion—shaping and structuring the choices so that persuasion is unnecessary. They tend to perceive the entirety of the game—the opportunities in the system—and they work continuously to align their short-term interests (e.g., party influence, appreciation, and/or respect) with their long-term goals (e.g., the presidency), moving the puzzle pieces to fit with their ideal picture.

Opportunistic aspirants also aim to account for contingency. This means that although they are “risk takers,” they rarely engage in “risky” behavior or throw “hail Mary” passes. Instead, they tend to look for win-win strategies and “high-percentage” situations. For example, Polk calculated that his strategy of remaining loyal to Van Buren would mean that if Van Buren withdrew, he would have a good shot at the nomination, and if Van Buren won, he would have a good shot at the nomination four (or at the outside, eight) years later. In short, Polk would likely win the Democratic nomination. The only real unknown was when. Moreover, by continuing to support Van Buren, even when many Democrats—including Jackson—were abandoning him, Polk would be perceived as a “leader” who was willing to stand on his principles (in favor of annexation) while remaining loyal to his past commitments and his party. And this would likely enhance his reputation as an “acceptable choice” for the nomination. Hence, opportunistic aspirants tend to