Jockeying for the American Presidency: The Political Opportunism ...

Although it seems clear that the rational choice paradigm is not always suitable for application in political science (e.g., in studies on the public's political knowledge and voting behavior), it remains the most appropriate paradigm for research on political elites who are focused on enhancing their power and improving their position in politics and the institutions within which they operate. As such, this study aligns with Terry Moe's suggestions and posits that rational choice theory and the institutional design of the presidency and its two-stage selection method (party nominations and the Electoral College) structure aspirant decisions and behaviors. Whereas the consequences of this perspective will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter, it is nonetheless important to point out here that the assumptions about the rationality of aspirants in this research are embedded within a larger political development framework. In other words, although it is assumed that the aspirants and the parties they lead respond rationally to their environment (historical context, institutional structure, and political opportunity) in each election cycle, over time, with the advantage of hindsight, it becomes evident that the behavioral norms of the aspirants and the institutional structures of the parties evolve organically, even creatively. Hence, this research both draws on and attempts to bridge the rational choice and the American political development literatures.²⁵

Even though political change and institutional development are viewed as evolutionary, or more precisely—borrowing Roy Nichols’ term—“improvisational” in nature, this study divides history into three periods: 1796–1860; 1864–1968; and 1972–2004. Addressed more in chapter 2, these eras (“Early Party,” “Strong Party,” and “Modern Party”) were designed to reflect (1) the opportunities available to the aspirants, given the level of party development and the structure of partisan competition and (2) the strategies employed by the aspirants to earn their party's presidential nomination. Nevertheless, this research agrees with David Mayhew's recent observation that “in certain key respects, that era [1788–1824] was not all that different from our own. The first dozen elections of American history brought two incumbent losses (in 1800 and 1828) and, it is probably fair to say, four close finishes (in 1796, 1800,