Majority Leadership in the U.S. Senate: Balancing Constraints By ...

State

Senate majority leaders have, essentially, dual electoral constituencies—their state and their party. And while all senators owe allegiance to both, the leaders face unique cross-pressures because of their sequential elections, first by state, then by party; their reelections depend on successful balancing of the varying demands of the different audiences. They must be senators before they are Senate majority leaders; the leaders must represent the interests of their states. These interests are defined in the context of the campaign and, in the heterogeneous environment of a state, can range from localized concerns to national policy (Abramowitz & Segal, 1992; Fenno, 1996; Jacobson, 2009). Leadership complicates the task of representation. Despite the partisan sorting of the past few decades (Abramowitz, Alexander, & Gunning, 2006; Bishop, 2008; Oppenheimer, 2005b), there are cases in which the policy preferences of the Senate majority leaders’ states may conflict with the policy preferences of the party they lead (e.g., Tom Daschle). However, a Senate majority leader may find state demands take the more tangible form of distributive benefits as he assumes leadership. That is, one way of balancing conflicting expectations is to use his party and institutional clout to “bring home the bacon.”

As party and institutional head, a Senate majority leader may be positioned to get more federal dollars for his state. The leading players in pork barrel politics (the appropriations committee, for example) may be willing to supply the Senate majority leader with appropriations or earmarks he can “claim credit” (Mayhew, 1974) and the Senate majority leader, in turn, can assist with their needs of agenda setting and scheduling. This trade is more than a quid pro quo, however, because quality state representation (if in benefits rather than policy) secures the reelectoral prospects of the Senate majority leader and diminishes uncertainty for a party needing leadership.

Party

On an individual level, reelection may be the underlying goal of every member of Congress (Mayhew, 1974). But as a collective, congressional