The FCC and the Politics of Cable TV Regulation, 1952-1980: Organizational Learning and Policy Development
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5. Gregory Hooks, “From an Autonomous to a Captured State Agency: The Decline of the New Deal in Agriculture,” American Sociological Review 55 (1990): 29–43; Christopher McGrory Klyza, “A Window of Autonomy: State Autonomy and the Forest Service in the Early 1900s,” Polity 25 (1992): 173–196; Erwin G. Krasnow, Lawrence D. Longley, and Herbert A. Terry, The Politics of Broadcast Regulation, 3rd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982); Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk, The Politics of Deregulation (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985).
6. Richard A. Harris and Sidney M. Milkis, The Politics of Regulatory Change: A Tale of Two Agencies(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Marc K. Landy, Marc J. Roberts, and Stephen R. Thomas, The Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Marc Allen Eisner, Antitrust and the Triumph of Economics: Institutions, Expertise, and Policy Change(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Hugh R. Slotten, Radio and Television Regulation: Broadcast Technology in the United States, 1920–1960 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).
7. Mathew D. McCubbins, “The Legislative Design of Regulatory Institutions,” American Journal of Political Science 29 (1985): 721–748.
8. Terry M. Moe, “The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure,” in Can the Government Govern?, ed. John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, 267–329 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989); David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); B. Dan Wood and John Bohte, “Political Transaction Costs and the Politics of Administrative Design,” Journal of Politics66 (2004): 176–202.
9. Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3 (1987): 243–277. Several studies have elaborated the McCubbins-Noll-Weingast thesis. See Kathleen Bawn, “Political Control versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures,” American Political Science Review 89 (1995): 62–73; Charles R. Shipan, Designing Judicial Review: Interest Groups, Congress, and Communications Policy(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997).