| Chapter 1: | Introduction |
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broadcasting was still in its experimental stages and could not have been characterized as a fully formed industry, let alone a politically influential one. As a result, it would have been very difficult—if not impossible—for Congress to act strategically in favor of either the broadcasting or the cable industry.18 Furthermore, once the practical and political implications of cable television had become clear in the 1960s, Congress made no serious effort to drastically alter the FCC's statutory authority or to impose procedural constraints that would advantage either side of the controversy. Rather, Congress seemed willing, if not content, to let the FCC gain experience with cable television and experiment with new policy choices.
Finally, principal-agent models do not provide a complete explanation for regulatory agency policymaking because they preclude consideration of factors other than the strategic decisions of external political actors. With respect to the FCC, at least, a more thorough explanation of policymaking requires consideration of the internal workings of the agency itself as well as of its external political and institutional environment. The FCC is an independent regulatory commission entrusted by Congress with a broad delegation of statutory authority. External actors—such as presidents, legislators, interest groups, and courts—create legal and political opportunities and constraints that frame the FCC's actions; however, these external forces do not control the FCC's decisions in any real sense. Rather, the scope and direction of FCC regulatory policy is determined equally by the agency's ability to access and utilize technical knowledge, by the policy orientations of FCC leaders, and by the broader policy ideas and beliefs that frame discussions concerning US communications policy.19
Thus, in order to provide a complete explanation of regulatory policymaking, a theory must take into consideration the