1. Stanley M. Besen and Robert W. Crandall, “The Deregulation of Cable Television,” Law and Contemporary Problems 44 (1981): 77–124; Patrick R. Parsons, Blue Skies: A History of Cable Television (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008).

2. Martin H. Seiden, Cable Television USA: An Analysis of Government Policy (New York: Praeger, 1972); Don R. LeDuc, Cable Television and the FCC: A Crisis in Media Control(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1973).

3. Thomas Streeter, “The Cable Fable Revisited: Discourse, Policy, and the Making of Cable Television,” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 4 (1987): 174–200; Patrick R. Parsons, “Defining Cable Television: Structuration and Public Policy,” Journal of Communication 39, no. 2 (1989): 10–26.

4. Marver H. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1955); Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969). Here, I am referring mainly to the capture theorists who wrote about regulatory agency behavior. Economic capture theory—more commonly known as the economic theory of regulation—systematically examines the origins of regulation in general, encompassing the behavior of legislators as well as bureaucrats. On the economic theory of regulation, see George J. Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2 (1971): 3–31. Economic capture theory has received some empirical support in studies of regulatory policy at the state level, though most scholars have concluded that interest groups are only one variable influencing regulatory policy. See, for instance, William Gormley, The Politics of Public Utility Regulation (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983); Kenneth J. Meier, The Political Economy of Regulation: The Case of Insurance (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988); Paul Teske, After Divestiture: The Political Economy of Regulation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990).