| Chapter 1: | Introduction |
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FCC finally implemented a comprehensive system of regulations for a cable industry that was, at this point, rapidly expanding and changing. The new regulations were a painstakingly negotiated compromise designed to promote the development of cable television while protecting broadcasters. Nevertheless, within just a few years the FCC concluded that most of these regulations were unnecessary and proceeded to repeal them.
The purpose of this study is to explain why the FCC struggled to decide whether and how to regulate the cable television industry between 1952 and 1980. From a scholarly perspective, explaining the plight of FCC cable television regulation is desirable for two reasons. First, this critical period in the history of cable regulation has never been fully analyzed from a social science perspective. Prior studies have taken the form of policy histories,1 scholarly commentaries,2 and theory-driven studies focused around shorter time frames.3 None of these studies, however, employ empirical social science theory to systematically explain policy development throughout the entire twenty-eight-year period. A major purpose of the present study is to fill this gap in the literature.
Second, it is hoped that the systematic examination of FCC cable television regulation will inject new insights into the decades-old theoretical debate over the politics of regulatory agency policymaking. During the 1950s, ’60s, and ’70s, scholars generally adhered to the belief that regulatory agencies were susceptible to “capture” by powerful organized interests. Although capture theory produced some influential theoretical propositions, the empirical evidence was (at best) mixed.4 Case study evidence produced in the 1980s and ’90s demonstrated that US regulatory agencies may appear captured at some moments in time, whereas they act with tremendous autonomy at others.5 Additional empirical evidence revealed that regulatory agency