Defamation, Libel Tourism and the SPEECH Act of 2010: The First Amendment Colliding with the Common Law
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Defamation, Libel Tourism and the SPEECH Act of 2010: The First ...

Chapter 1:  Defamation Laws on a Collision Course: The Evolution and Convergence of American and English Law
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reckless disregard in verifying whether the statements were true or not. Not only was Albin not available to testify at the trial, but St. Amant also did not supply the trial court with any evidence of Albin’s reputation for being truthful or reliable.41

The US Supreme Court accepted the factual findings made by the Louisiana courts. However, the Supreme Court held that Thompson had not sustained his burden of proving St. Amant’s reckless disregard of the truth. The court acknowledged that reckless disregard of the truth could not be given a precise definition but stated that there were constitutional parameters that limited the lower courts in making such a finding:

[E]vidence of either deliberate falsification or reckless publication despite the publisher’s awareness of probable falsity was essential to recovery by officials in defamation actions. These cases are clear that reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.42

Reckless disregard was defined as the publisher actually having serious doubts about the truth of the publication or being aware of probable falsity. The Court seemed to anticipate criticism that this reckless disregard standard put “a premium on ignorance” and encouraged the irresponsible publisher not to inquire. Nevertheless, the Court specifically rejected a reasonable publisher standard:

It may be said that such a test puts a premium on ignorance, encourages the irresponsible publisher not to inquire, and permits the issue to be determined by defendant’s testimony that he published the statement in good faith and unaware of its probable falsity. Concededly the reckless disregard standard may permit recovery in fewer situations than would a rule that publishers must satisfy the standard of the reasonable man or the prudent publisher…. Neither lies nor false communications serve the ends