reckless disregard of the truth (continued) |
Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, 31–35 |
Masson v. New Yorker |
Magazine, 41 |
question for jury, 54 |
reasonableness standard, 39 |
Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc, 38–40 |
reform of defamation laws (UK), 262–266 |
compliance with Human Rights Act and European Convention, 263 |
growth in libel claims, 264 |
interest of the public in reform, 265 |
jurisdiction, 265 |
Lord Lester’s proposal, 262 |
simpler democracy, 263 |
United Nations Human Rights Committee, 272 |
vested defamation industry, 263–265 |
Rehnquist, Chief Justice William, 30–31 |
reportage, 56–73 |
analogy to hearsay evidence, 64–66 |
Charman v. Orion group Publishing group, Inc., 64 |
derived from fair report privilege, 61–62 |
reportage (continued) |
Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., 57 |
Elder, David, 68 |
European Court of Human Rights, 66–68 |
fair report, 68–73 |
Harte-Hanks, 58 |
limited role in US, 60 |
lost opportunity in Harte-Hanks, 58 |
newsworthiness, 72 |
not required by First Amendment, 58 |
rejected in Pennsylvania, 59 |
Roberts v. Gable, 62–64 |
same as neutral reportage, 56 |
Selisto v. Finland, 67 |
special application of Reynolds, 62–64 |
Thoma v. Luxembourg, 66–67 |
Verlagsgruppe News GmbH v. Austria, 67–68 |
wire service defence, 60–61 |
reputation |
Canada, 137 |
common law, 44 |
European Convention on Human Rights, Article 10, 158 |
First Amendment, 41 |
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc, 119–121 |
private persons, 120 |
societal value, 101 |
valued in US and England, 161 |