| Chapter 1: | Introduction |
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The effect of Rule XIX is to permit extended debate on any measure. When a senator intentionally uses this provision to delay or prevent passage of a pending measure—that is, engages in a filibuster—he or she leverages Rule XIX for authority. As I discuss in the following text, until the second decade of the twentieth century, this right to proceed without interruption was absolute, as Senate rules did not permit a vote of cloture to terminate debate until 1917.
Defenses of the Filibuster
The filibuster has its defenders, as well. Supporters of the practice commonly remind critics that the Senate was never designed to be a majoritarian institution. Not only is representation in the chamber based upon a decidedly non-majoritarian formula, but the Constitution also explicitly establishes non-majority thresholds for a number of Senate activities, such as ratification of treaties and impeachment convictions, both of which require two-thirds support. From the beginning, the non-majoritarian nature of the Senate was seen as a bulwark against the passage of ill-considered or even dangerous legislation. As Federalist 62 noted, “[a]nother advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of the Senate is, the additional impediment it must prove against improper acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a majority of the States.” Although Publius may not have anticipated anything like the filibuster, supporters of the practice often couch their defense in similar terms. In the words of the late Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV), “[a]s long as a people have a forum in which members can speak at length, the people's liberties will be safe” (CongressDailyAM 1993, 1, 7).
Others point to related virtues of the filibuster, including the veto power it hands to intensely affected minorities. Although a one-person-one-vote formula might make sense if every person cared equally about every issue, that condition rarely holds. In the real world of political decision making, it is often the case that a minority cares passionately about an issue whereas the majority does not. Filibusters provide a mechanism