| Chapter 1: | Introduction |
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for a Senate minority to take advantage of its intensity. In the words of David Mayhew, they “give, in effect, extra stacks of trading chips to intense minorities that face not-so-intense majorities” (Mayhew 2003, 31–36).
Mayhew provided an even more positive defense for the filibuster in his book America's Congress. Praising the stability of American political institutions, Mayhew argued that the American system requires most contentious issues to be addressed in a “public sphere” and that mechanisms like the filibuster have the value of heightening public awareness of and debate about controversial issues. The delay caused by a filibuster may buy time for the opposition to identify and mobilize political support for their cause, but the need to craft legislation that is strong enough to survive such parliamentary tactics can force political opponents to work together in the interest of creating better public policy. Mayhew explained:
Of course, in the world of practical politics, principles are often hostage to circumstance. Today's defender of the filibuster as a principled stand for a meritorious minority in the face of a majority's callous rush to judgment is tomorrow's vociferous critic of the practice as an undemocratic anachronism when it is deployed by the opposition (Boaz 2005).
Defining and Identifying Filibusters
Identifying exactly what does and does not count as a filibuster is a daunting task. As the discussion in this introductory chapter has made clear, filibusters occur because there is nothing to prevent a senator or small group of senators from holding the floor indefinitely. There are,