| Chapter 1: | Introduction |
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This is likely the reason that so much remains unknown about the Senate filibuster. Filibusters are difficult to identify definitively, and until recently, efforts to catalog the use of the tactic had not identified the senator or senators responsible for leading the dilatory effort. Previous efforts to analyze the filibuster likely did not include senator-level data in their analyses because of the difficulty of obtaining it; this lack of analysis on the individual level has stripped much of the academic analysis of the filibuster of its color (and as the preceding examples suggest, the Senate has certainly had its share of colorful personalities, many of whom have led filibusters). The lack of individual-level data on filibustering has also prevented scholars from fully understanding the dynamics of the practice in the Senate. Even when filibustering has been explained, as studies such as those by Binder and Smith (1997), Schickler and Wawro (2006), and Koger (2010) have done reasonably well, it has not been contextualized within theories of senators’ behavior more generally, nor has it been discussed relative to senators’ other legislative activities. As a result, much of what congressional scholars know about filibustering in the Senate is based on general observations about the use and consequences of extended debate at the chamber level. But, in a chamber where so much depends upon the whims of individual senators, that previous studies of the Senate filibuster have largely ignored individual-level analysis of the procedure is unfortunate.
More importantly, the lack of individual-level data about filibustering has led many previous studies to suffer ecological inference problems or to reach conclusions about the dynamics of filibustering that are inaccurate. For example, scholars have suggested that filibusters are often waged to protect senators’ constituents from legislation that would be harmful to their interests. On its face, this conclusion makes sense because filibusters are frequently waged against bills that affect salient issues (e.g., civil rights, nuclear waste storage) or that provoke intense public response both in favor and in opposition. However, if senators’ motivations to filibuster were largely driven by their constituencies, one would find that both senators from a particular state would