Cuban–Latin American Relations in the Context of a Changing Hemis ...

Hemispheric Affairs and CIP Analysts Look at Obama’s First Year by the Americas Program of the Center for International Policy.⁷

Obama’s potentially new approach to the region was initially validated at the Summit of the Americas in Port of Spain, Trinidad, in April 2009; at the meeting, Obama repeated many of the themes of his Miami speech. However, no new policy initiatives were launched. In addition, in the face of sustained Latin American pressure for a new U.S. policy toward Cuba, Obama refused to reduce the U.S. embargo in any meaningful manner. U.S. policy toward Cuba also dominated the May 2009 OAS meeting in San Pedro Sula. All of the Latin American countries that were present voted to end Cuba’s suspension from the organization, but the unanimous Latin American position did not succeed in moving the United States away from its long-held position.

The Obama administration has made some very small overtures to Cuba, including resurrecting the regular diplomatic conversations on immigration, exhibiting a greater acceptance of cultural and academic exchanges, and allowing increased travel of Cuban Americans to the island. However, the fundamental principles of the embargo have remained in place along with the United States’ insistence that normalized relations with the island and its return to the OAS be conditional on it making a “democratic transition” that includes the departure of the Communist Party from power. The latter point makes real negotiation with the existing Cuban leadership next to impossible. More diplomatic conversations between the two countries have occurred in the two years following Obama’s election, but there has been no evidence that these discussions have moved significantly beyond the restatement of historic positions by both sides. In addition, there has been no change in U.S. relations with Venezuela. The Obama administration has continued the militarization of Venezuela’s region by building up the previously suspended U.S. Fourth Fleet in the Caribbean and signing a new agreement with Colombia for access to seven military bases in that country. The focus on Colombia was necessitated in part by the Ecuadoran government’s refusal to renew the U.S. base at Manta and by the country’s previous military withdrawals under pressure from Panama (1999) and Puerto Rico (2003).⁸