Power and Politics in Tenth-Century China: The Former Shu Regime ...

Tang replaced the Liang and expanded to a larger territory, the real political division in most of China, especially in the south, never changed. Although the ambitious founding emperor, Zhuangzong (Li Cunxu , 885–926, r. 923–926), achieved nominal unification in North China and even briefly occupied Shu, his dream of true unification soon proved unrealistic and only brought his reign to a swift end. His successor, though achieving some successes in reestablishing the “central” authority in the north, had to shift to a more practical policy in dealing with quasi-independent border provinces and rivals of equal power in the south, concentrating his administrative and economic base in Henan and Hedong , two central provinces in the north.²⁰ The next northern regime, the Later Jin (936–946), was relatively weak and faced formidable challenges, not only from other Chinese powers from the south but also from one-time allies to the north, the Kitan (later known as the Liao , 907–1125). The situation changed little under the Later Han (947–950), a very short-lived regime that was founded after the Kitan (Liao) destroyed the Later Jin. It seems that a unifying force first emerged with the founding of the Later Zhou (951–960), which annexed some lands of its southern neighbors and pursued an increasingly ambitious political goal of reunification.²¹ But Later Zhou hegemony was not universally recognized by contemporary rivals, especially some southern imperial regimes, which strove to maintain the original political balance and their own independence. Even when the Northern Song succeeded the Zhou in 960 and began its unification effort, the final transformation of the Song from a “regional” power in North China to a unified imperial empire governing the entirety of China proper did not formally and finally emerged until some years later.²² To be fair, “it is reasonable to consider the period before the Jianlong era (960–963) of Song as a sort of ‘warring states’” (), as the Qing (1644–1911) historian Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692) commented. And in this multistate environment, he continued, “none of the rulers deserved to become the Son of Heaven” ( ).²³

In fact, all of the so-called “Ten States” were just as autonomous as their northern counterparts. Of course, with different geographical