1. For more on President Wilson and the League of Nations, see chapter 2.

2. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

3. See, e.g., Michael Walzer, “The Reform of the International System.” In Studies of War and Peace, ed. Oyvind Osterud (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1986), 227–250.

4. President Wilson’s speech before Congress on April 2, 1917, when the United States declared war on Germany: “Making the World ‘Safe for Democracy’: Woodrow Wilson Asks for War,” http://historymatters.​gmu.​edu/d/4​9​4​3​.​

5. For the different approaches to world politics in 1919, see Hans F. Petersson, Power and International Order: An Analytical Study of Four Schools of Thought and their Approaches to the War, the Peace and a Post-War System, 1914–1919 (Lund: Gleerup, 1964). For the school of thought considered here (which Petersson labeled “radical”), see especially 92, 224, 228–229, 294, 337, 354.

6. David Held, “Democratic Accountability and Political Effectiveness from a Cosmopolitan Perspective,” Government and Opposition 39 (2004): 364–391.

7. Leif Lewin, Democratic Accountability: Why Choice in Politics Is Both Possible and Necessary (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 13.

8. Robert O. Keohane, “Accountability in World Politics,” Scandinavian Political Studies 29 (2006): 85.

9. Ruth W. Grant and Robert O. Keohane, “Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics,” The American Political Science Review 99 (2005): 29–43.

10. Leif Lewin, Folket och eliterna: En studie i modern demokratisk teori [The People and the Elites: A Study in Modern Democratic Theory] (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1970).

11. Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (1939; London: Palgrave, 2001), 84.

12. Keohane has classified himself as an “interdependist.” He criticized realism on the grounds that states are not condemned to struggle for