Individual Autonomy and Responsibility in Late Imperial China By ...

Another objection to the Confucian concept of dignity is grounded in the fact that in Confucianism, and even more so in Neo-Confucianism, the human being is particularly valuable; the human being is the center of the universe, but human dignity is based on moral potentiality due to human nature and education. It is clear that if one means rites as being those elaborated by ancient Confucianism, the discourse on dignity is limited to obedience to that specific moral system. Sacrality does not concern people with their good and bad points, but their virtue. In other words, one’s humanity depends on one’s morality: without benevolence, one is no more human. To reduce dignity to moral duty means affecting the quality of being human to the potentiality of adapting oneself to certain regulations. The risk of this identification of a certain moral system with the quality of being human is dangerous because it may be the root of prejudices, moral disengagement, discriminations, and dehumanization. Moreover, such regulations were legitimated by tradition, and not based on objective parameters, such as coexistence and mutual utility, acceptable by all. This has entailed great danger because the “transgressor” is deprived of humanity and this degradation to sub-human cannot but have serious social consequences.¹⁵

Otherwise, the potential inherent in all people is to be understood in a dynamic sense as the morality of each individual, the sense of responsibility in assessing and responding to situations according to one’s conscience. Mencius and Xunzi did not create a universal moral theory but have rather offered pragmatic instructions for a dignified, pleasant life, based on humaneness, where, in a humanistic way, respect, sympathy, wealth, and prestige were considered positive.¹⁶

In “Human Rights in China,” Heiner Roetz presents various examples about the intrinsic value of dignity in Confucianism; for example, when he quotes Mencius on the behavior of the king: “Although we can call Mengzi’s ethics primarily duty-oriented, there is an obvious complementarity here of a duty on the side of the king and a moral quasi-right on the side of the people: they do not deserve to be treated worse than