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9. See, for instance, “[d]eath and life have their determined appointment; riches and honors depend upon Heaven” (Lunyu, Yan Yuan 顏淵, 5, quoted in note 6 of this chapter); “[t]hat which is done without man’s doing is from Heaven. That which happens without man’s causing is from the ordinance of Heaven” (莫之為而為者，天也；莫之致而至者，命也) (Mencius, Wan Zhang I 萬章上, 6). Complicating things even more is the fact that the same sources use ming as “life span” and “appointment’s duty” (Zuozhuan, Wengong 文公, 13; Legge, The Chinese Classics, 263–264. Besides these, there are other controversial interpretations. For Mencius ming should be awaited (siming 俟命), accompanied in harmony (peiming 配命), accepted (shunshou 順受), understood (zhiming 知命), relied on (liming 立命). See Valmisa, “The Reification of Fate in Early China,” 35–36. According to Raphals, the Confucian theory of siming 俟命, awaiting ming, argued that Heaven rewards virtue overall, but unpredictably, with the implied recommendation to practice self-cultivation and await the Mandate of Heaven (“Fate, Fortune, Chance, and Luck,” 539). The ambiguity of the term ming—like tian—is primarily due to the evolution of religious thought and the new meanings that came to be ascribed to it in different historical periods. A further distinction is made between individual’s and collective destiny (see Raphals, “Fate, Fortune, Chance, and Luck,” 537–574). It was not only Confucius but Mencius too who used ming in a complex way, as the distinction between fixed destiny and moral decree is not always clear—expressions like “knowing ming” or “establishing ming” carry both meanings of destiny and moral decree (Ning Chen, “The Concept of Fate in Mencius,” 501–504; and Puett, “Following the Commands of Heaven,” 49–69). Later, in his commentary to this passage of Mencius (Jin Xin I 盡心上), Zhao Qi 趙岐 identifies three kinds of destiny: (1) the “positive retributive destiny” which accounts for the one who does good and receives good; (2) the “disastrous destiny” occurring when one does good and receives bad; (3) “negative retributive destiny” which explains why those who do bad receive bad (命有三名，行善得善曰受命，行善得惡曰遭命，行惡得惡曰隨命; Mengzi Zhushu 孟子注疏, juan 13, part one, in Siku Quanshu, Jingbu 經部, Sishulei 四書類). Commenting further on Mencius’s thought of five senses and moral dispositions (Jin Xin II 盡心下, 70), Zhao mentions also another option, that of “luck and destiny” (minglu 命祿) which is assumed to take place when one can gratify senses (Ning Chen, “The Concept of Fate in Mencius,” 496–497). This distinction is no less important as it implies refusal to acknowledge retribution.