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her husband, even though he neglected her; and the Wife of the Man of Cai (Cai Ren zhi qi 蔡人之妻), a woman who became engaged to a man with a serious illness and did not listen to her mother’s advice to divorce him. (Guarde-Paz, “Moral Dilemmas in Chinese Philosophy,” 90–91).

149. Shangyu xianzhi, 15: 309, cited in Elvin, “Female Virtue and the State in China,” 143.

150. “逃出苦海” (Jinghuayuan, 94: 479).

151. For ancient Greek philosophy, see Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 25–50, and Vegetti, L’Etica degli Antichi, 99, 192, 227. The Stoic Seneca defines primus motus as the first stimulation of passion in the rational soul, or in the irrational soul as a shock which reason cannot avoid—“Est primus motus non voluntarius, quasi preparatio adfectus et quaedam comminatio [...] Primum illum animi ictum effugere ratione non possumus” (De ira, II); the first reaction to a wrong is distinguished from the passion of anger. This “strategic moment” influenced the later debate on passions and sin.

152. Dal Pra, Conosci te Stesso, 12.

153. Cited in Stoppacci, “Le «Glossae Continuae in Psalmos»,” 304. For many theologians, the subject was not responsible for their primary natural impulses, while they were responsible for secondary impulses which implied their free will. See Boquet, “Des Racines de l’émotion,” 163–186.

154. Baladier, Éros au Moyen âge; Baladier, et al., “L’Amour au Moyen Âge,” 133–157, http://www.​persee.​fr/​doc/​medi_​0​7​5​1​-​2​7​0​8​_​2​0​0​1​_​num_​2​0​_​4​0​_​1​5​1​7​.​ See also Boquet and Nagy, Sensible Moyen Âge, and Le Sujet des émotions au Moyen Âge; Reddy, Making of Romantic Love. On virtue and sin see Rohmer, La Finalité Morale, 12; and Di Martino, “Il Ruolo della Intentio,” 173–198. For later ecclesiastical stances on delight, lingering thoughts (morosité), pleasure, desire, and the four stages (impulse, consent, delight, and satisfaction) as theorized by Alphonse de Liguori at the end of the eighteenth century, see Foucault, Abnormal, 190–191; and de Liguori, Sermoni compendiati, vol. III, Sermone 47, 562–563.

155. Boureau, “Un Sujet Agité,” 189. Thus the condition of justice is not innate in man, but it is possible only because of God.

156. Jiang Xinyan, “Mencius on Moral Responsibility,” 142–159.

157. Exceptions include conflicts between duties and heroic acts in the name of filial piety and chastity. See Santangelo, Il “Peccato” in Cina, 146–191; and Standaert, “Zui, Zuigan, yu Zhongguo Wenhua,” 352–363. This