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76. See the observations of Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, 293. The “automatism” and the “spontaneity” of the behavior of the sage, both Neo-Confucian and Daoist, transcend the wearisome process of conscious choice and internal struggle, which are unavoidable for the ordinary person, and in this way necessity and freedom as well as determinism and responsibility are merged into a single point in time. The movements of the sage are like that of a machine, and the commentator adds that it is a machine without intentions or mind (wuxin 無心). See the anecdote about Guan Zhong, and the discussion between Yang Bu and Yang Zhu in Liezi [Master Lie] (ca. 3rd century AD), 6: 213–214.

77. Wang Yunping (“Confucian ethics and emotions,” 355–359) quotes Analects 9.18 and 4.6, and Mencius’s child-like innocent heart (赤子之心).

78. Fingarette, “The Problem of the Self in the Analects,” 135. See also note 191 of chapter 1. For different conclusions, see Myeong-seok Kim, “Choice, Freedom, and Responsibility,” 17–38.

79. The apparent contradiction between the constant watchfulness over one’s faults and the spontaneity of effortless action of the sage reminds us of the skill of the cook Ding in Zhuangzi. On both spontaneous and conscious levels, see David Wong (“Cultivating the Self in Concert with Others” 186–189, “Early Confucian Philosophy and the Development of Compassion,” 185–187), and Tiwald (“Dai Zhen on Human Nature,” 399–422).

80. See examples from Romance of the Three Kingdoms (or Sanguo Yanyi) in Plaks, The Four Masterworks, 392, 422, 439–440. For a cross reference, see Zhongguo Chengyu Dacidian, 1635.

81. Jinsilu Jijie, 4: 139 (translated by Chan Wingtsit, Reflections on Things at Hand, 132). See Zhuzi Yulei, 104: 2623. For a concrete comparison with the classical way of dealing with emotions in the Western thought, see Descartes, Les Passions de l’ame. Part I, Articles 40–50.

82. Li Zhi, Fenshu, 2: 46; Xu Fenshu, 2: 74–75; Cangshu, 9: 146, 68: 1140–1142. This problem seems to be absent in Daoism where the entire question has been inverted into a conflict between freedom and necessity—a conflict that the Daoists ultimately resolve by transcending the sage and by resorting to embryology and physiognomy. Simply put, the Daoists affirm the determined nature of fate—and here one thinks about the self-justification of a criminal who attributes the penal amputation of his leg to Heaven—but counterbalance this with the liberty of the “true man” who knows how to identify himself with the ineluctable transformations