approach on self-representation, see Ames, Mor, and Toma, “The Double-edge of Similarity and Difference Mindsets,” 583–587.

3. Microbiome is defined as the collective genomes of microbes such as bacteria, bacteriophage, fungi, protozoa, and viruses that live inside and on the human body in a symbiotic relationship and contribute to the extension of the definition of biological identity of the individual. This “ecological community” of commensal, symbiotic, and pathogenic microorganisms that inhabit the human body regulates the immune system, brain functions—bidirectional gut-brain axis integrates the gut and central nervous system activities—and associates with human genome variations. Then, if the “colonies” guested in our body are not only hosts but part of it, what are the borders between “us” and the environment? See Rees, Bosch, and Douglas, “How the Microbiome Challenges Our Concept of Self”; Levy and Borenstein, “Metabolic Modeling of Species Interaction”; Wang and Kasper, “The Role of Microbiome in Central Nervous System Disorders”; and Luca, Kupfer, Knights, Khoruts, and Blekhman, “Functional Genomics of Host-Microbiome Interactions in Humans.” Noteworthy is the intuitive description done by Spinoza on the psychological and the physical roots of passion, arising from his claims that the human mind is the idea of the human body (Ethics, part 2, prop. 13 and 15): a great number of bodies compose the human body and thus a corresponding number of correlate ideas compose the human mind. (LeBuffe, “The Anatomy of the Passions,” 190–191).

4. For a neurophilosophical interpretation of the self, the mentioned philosopher Metzinger (Being no-one) argues that phenomenal selves appear only in conscious illusory experience through a kind of mental simulation, self-representation and self-model (Phenomenal Self Model). Boddice in The History of Emotions and its presentation (https://dx.​doi.​org/​1​0​.​7​4​4​0​/​res6​2​.​2​0​1​7​.​0​2​) offers a balanced survey of themes and questions on the history of emotions, and brought forth new insights that benefit from the findings of social neuroscience, beyond the mere ‘naturalisation’ of human phenomenon. Any further attempt to build a biocultural perspective will be useful as far as satisfactory historical essays will be produced. Other scholars stress the incompatibility of neurohistory with the historical work (Boquet and Nagy, Emotions historiques, 15–26). Rosenwein (“Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions”) proposes an alternative method based on social costructivism and cognitive psychology. On a dialogue between the divergent approaches