1. de Bary, The Liberal Tradition in China, 43–66; and Chen, “The Ethics of Self,” 68. On the field of fine arts, see Loehr, “The Question of Individualism in Chinese Art,” 147–158.

2. This aspect has been expounded by Roger Ames in several essays.

3. Schwartz, “Some Polarities in Chinese Thought,” 3–15.

4. Hall and Ames, Thinking through Confucius, 23.

5. Munro, Individualism and Holism.

6. Markus and Kitayama, “Culture and the Self,” 224–253.

7. See Roetz’s arguments in Confucian Ethics of the Axial Age; “Tradition, Universality, and the Time Paradigm of Zhou Philosophy,” 359–375; and “A Comment on Pragmatism in Chinese Studies,” 279–299. Roetz singles out a kind of gentleman’s dialectical process of turning away from society, into his inner self to search for autonomous action, and finally returning back to society (“Tradition, Universality, and the Time Paradigm of Zhou Philosophy,” 368). Particularly useful are his efforts toward a “reconstructive hermeneutics of accommodation” aimed at discovering and matching modern concepts of free citizenship with ancient philosophy (Li Minghui, “Rujia Chuantong yu Renquan,” 13). Roetz’s method can be summarized by using his words: “[…] the very coming into existence of Chinese philosophy itself […] was the answer to the deep crisis and breakdown of tradition in the middle of the last millennium BC. This formative experience, which leads into the axial age, is reflected in an impressive series of anti-traditional arguments brought forward in the philosophical classics. They call into question the reliability and validity of appeals to tradition by logical (tradition presupposes innovation), ontological (the true cannot be transmitted), epistemological (the past is not clearly recognizable), historical (times have changed), empirical (tradition is too heterogeneous), ethical (traditional ways of life can contradict moral norms), and anti-ideological (traditions can be forged) considerations” (“Human Rights in China,” 301). In extending his analysis to the non-Confucian schools, Roetz stresses how Mozi rejected to take one’s norms from the conventional authorities (Confucian Ethics of the Axial Age, 1–22, 149–184, 161, 233–264, and “The ‘Dignity within Oneself,’” 236–261).