Individual Autonomy and Responsibility in Late Imperial China By ...

Introduction

Several studies have focused on the representation of the self in Chinese civilization from different perspectives.¹ The working assumption is that the emotive sphere is the expression of the individual self, and moral dynamics can be better explained by laying stress on affective components of the self that are usually considered lower, the so-called “concupiscible” and “irascible souls.” This study will avoid any theoretical discussion on the nature of the self and personality, the difference between the subjective reference to one’s self and identity, the question of whether identity is an objective or subjective perception, as well as any comparison of perspectives from various disciplines.² There is no unique concept of selfhood; what we call the “self” is instable, flexible, and mutable with circumstances and due to a multiplicity of experiences and manifestations as well as social interactions between the unconscious, one’s self-image, and the stereotypes imposed by others. Even in the Western “individualistic” tradition, the spheres to which humans belong, interrelated as communicating vessels, maintain distinct codes: the family is not the civil society; politics is not the economy; morals are not law. Moreover, the equilibrium reached by a coherent self is not everlasting because a change of human conditions (e.g., age, health, experience, learning) or the occurrence of certain shocking events (e.g., an existential