| Chapter 2: | The Open Door and Yesterday’s China |
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One of the things that had encouraged John Hay to think that the powers, particularly Russia, of which the highest degree of recalcitrance was expected, might go along with the first note of September 1899, was the fact that in taking the Liaotung leasehold, the tsar had promised that Dairen should be open throughout the entire period of the lease to the merchant ships of all nations.10 Behind this lay British overtures, as reported by Sir N. O’Connoer from St. Petersburg:
Another indication is the way in which in the fall of 1900 the British turned a vague German proposal for “a practical understanding on the question of the Yangtze” into a reaffirmation of the open door idea. Von Bulow having hinted at this, the British took it up despite the fact that, as expressed in a memorandum by Francis Bertie, they knew that “mere ‘open door’ or ‘open port’ and tariff declarations are not likely to satisfy her [Germany]. Her pretensions are large…[She] will probably claim Shantung and the valley of the Yellow River.”12
Despite these misgivings, the British negotiated from the position that “China should be kept open to the trade of all nations, that we should renounce for ourselves all attempts to take advantage of the present [Boxer] crisis for the purposes of further territorial acquisitions at the expense of China, and that we should oppose other Powers in making any similar attempt” and further that there should be “no special stipulations in favor of the principle of free trade in the Yangtze or any other particular part of China, for its effect would be held to be, and, in fact, would be, to abandon free trade in other parts of the Chinese dominions.” And indeed, this became the basis of the Anglo-German declaration of October 16, 1900.13