West Across the Pacific: American Involvement in East Asia from 1898 to the Vietnam War
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West Across the Pacific: American Involvement in East Asia from 1 ...

Chapter 2:  The Open Door and Yesterday’s China
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But neither rests on the sort of detailed analysis of diplomatic documents, which, while a little old fashioned perhaps, may still constitute our best check to rein in overly facile theorization by reminding us always of the contemporary situations in which diplomatic establishments worked. We therefore return to the documents that launched the open door era, not to retread the ground Griswold covered very well indeed, in explaining the Hippisley-Rockhill-Hay relationship and the formulation of the notes. Rather, we will turn to various other matters to which he and others have given insufficient attention, which will help us evaluate these latter-day indictments. Let us first ask the question Kennan’s analysis poses so dramatically. Were the open door notes merely “legalistic-moralistic” nonsense that only Americans, to their sorrow, took seriously? The records of other powers should be germane to the point.

The first paragraph of a document, labeled “secret,” signed with the initials J. C. (Joseph Chamberlain) from British cabinet papers, dated September 19, 1900, reads: “1. The primary interest of this country is to maintain the integrity of China, and with it the ‘open door’, by which I understand absolutely equality of opportunity for trade throughout the whole of the Chinese Empire. This equality would, necessarily, preclude any kind of indirect preference, such as more favorable rates on railways, etc.” Fourteen long and discursive points follow, in which Chamberlain points out clear and present dangers to this “primary interest” of Britain’s: Russian designs on Manchuria and North China; “France pledged to follow the lead of Russia”; Germany dependent on the “idiosyncrasy” of the Kaiser; and Japan, though “she would most probably desire, with us, to preserve the status quo,” would “certainly insist on compensation in Corea [sic] or elsewhere” if “Russia aggrandizes herself at the expense of China.” He assumes only the United States “to be absolutely sincere, and have no arrière pensée.”

Chamberlain continues,

But McKinley is not a strong man, and probably cares more for the presidential election than for the national interest in China.