West Across the Pacific: American Involvement in East Asia from 1 ...

It lies, not in friendly verbiage or clever diplomacy by Old John Sherman or his subordinates, but in a single cablegram, which Foreign Minister Okuma received from a former archrival, who had already been twice premier of Japan and who remained in 1897, and for many years to come, the single most powerful personage in the Japanese government, Ito Hirobumi. Ito was in London while the Hawaiian annexation affair came to a climax and Okuma, furious at the intransigence of the Hawaiian Republic to his claims of treaty violation in certain immigrant rejection cases and at the United States for offering the shelter of annexation promises, was drafting his protest. When Ito heard of it, he composed one paragraph, characteristically calm, realistic, and to the point and sent it to Okuma through St. Petersburg. He said, “Since England and other European Powers are indifferent about the American annexation of Hawaii, Japan will find herself in an extremely difficult position if she opposes it strongly. Therefore it is better to drop the whole matter at some opportune time and let it take its natural course. Though there is hope that the United States Senate may not ratify the annexation treaty, Japanese opposition would antagonize the American public and force even those who are against annexation to support it. Therefore it is best for you not to pursue this matter too deeply.”¹⁴

Okuma replied immediately and defensively, assuring Ito that he intended “only peaceful diplomacy” and “no endangering” of Japanese-American relations.¹⁵ Doubtless, the mood of caution and acquiescence, which Ito had set regarding Hawaii, also carried over into the Philippine matter, whatever more impetuous types, like Okuma, might have considered in their unguarded moments.

A second point deserves emphasis: the existence of a subtle quid pro quo in the Japanese acquiescence. The unsigned “note verbale,” which Minister Hoshi obtained from Secretary of State Sherman: namely, that the United States should guarantee that there would be no discrimination against Japanese residents in its territories. Sherman had avoided a commitment by pointing out that Congress only made the laws, and yet he had given an assurance of a sort in his reflection that none had occurred in the long and friendly history of Japanese-American relations.