Jimmy Carter and the Water Wars: Presidential Influence and the P ...

One of the likely reasons for this (beyond considerations like substantive policy differences or political gamesmanship) is that information about policy preferences and political intentions are limited under divided government; presidents and the majority leadership in Congress are less likely to interact with one another and exchange information that would improve each side’s ability to accurately determine the likely reaction of the other side during a veto bargaining process. Under united government, by contrast, information will flow more freely between the branches, thereby reducing, but not eliminating, uncertainty. Even under united government, however, the possibility of miscommunication, misperception, and obfuscation persists.

Congress considers a president of its own party differently than a president from the opposition party. Congress will be more hesitant to send a president of its own party legislation that will force him to make a difficult decision; such an action does not serve either actor well as it may raise issues about the party’s ability to govern. Challenging a president of the governing party with a veto override will be rarer yet as it simply magnifies the incapacity of the ruling party. On the other hand, Congress may challenge a president of the opposition party by daring him to veto legislation and betting that the president will draw more ire from the public than will Congress. Continuing the battle by pursuing an override will simply add to perception of the president as intransigent or weak, which is exactly what the congressional party is attempting to create. Cameron’s (2000, esp. 46–49) findings supported all three conjectures: vetoes are rarer in united government than in divided government, challenges of vetoes under united government are rare, and extended veto bargaining is more common under divided government.