| Chapter 1: | The Veto and Presidential Influence |
Political time also plays a role in the level of uncertainty about the policy preferences on either side of the veto struggle, as discussed previously. Uncertainty abounds early in a president’s term. A newly elected president faces initial challenges like having his cabinet members confirmed, gaining control over the bureaucracy, and proposing a revised budget. Regardless of past experience, a new president will not likely have a well-developed “veto strategy” that can be invoked upon his first congressional challenge; a president may well not know when he might issue a veto threat, much less choose to execute a veto. And the president’s veto strategy is nested within the presence of united or divided government. Congress, facing a president with which it has no past experience, has no context for judging the credibility of a veto threat; only repeated interaction with a president will demonstrate a president’s willingness to deliver on a veto threat.
Each side develops its veto strategy within the context of public opinion. Presidents appear to be more willing to threaten and exercise vetoes—and fight off overrides—when they enjoy high levels of public opinion.3 The effect of a veto, or a veto threat, on a president’s popularity is less clear. While James Bryce conjectured that “a president generally gains popularity by the bold use of his veto power” (quoted in Cameron 2000, 17), the theoretical and empirical literature suggest that a president’s popularity is undermined by public bargaining with Congress over public policy (Cameron, Lapinski, and Reimann 2000; Groseclose and McCarty 2001; Matthews 1989). Groseclose and McCarty’s theoretical model suggested that Congress puts forward legislation that will cause a president to use his vetoes in a way that makes the president appear extreme in the eyes of the public.