| Chapter 2: | Theory |
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Socialexchange theory is based on the premise of rational, opportunistic actors maintaining relationships as long as there is more reward than cost (Dowd, 1975; Lawler & Thye, 1999). As will be seen, a number of the hypotheses tested in our models are based on issues of selfinterest. To argue for the relevance of these exchange principles does not preclude, however, a concern with emotional commitments or value issues in cost/benefit calculations (Bengtson, Burgess, & Parrott, 1997; Dowd, 1980). Herein lies the relevance of a social-constructionist perspective. While approaching problems from quite different frameworks, the various theories subsumed under social constructionism agree with socialexchange theorists that actors make sense of the world through social participation. But quite distinct from the concerns of most socialexchange research, social constructionism focuses on intentionality and subjective meaning, best understood with reference to the particular contexts in which interaction takes place.
Constructionists shun cause and effect statements, preferring an interpretative appreciation of the many different worlds created by common understandings (Gubrium & Holstein, 1999; Shweder, 1991). This is hardly the stuff that can be illuminated by survey research in which openended questions are rare or absent. For this and other reasons, the approach taken here would not be congenial to those wedded to the more traditional constructionist perspective.
Notwithstanding these differences, by integrating the two3 perspectives—a task that has been called for but barely launched as yet—the shortcomings inherent in each can be minimized (E. Clarke, 1997; Mutran & Reitzes, 1984). In socialexchange theory, the criticism centers around a preference for mechanical procedures of analysis where one seeks in vain for real people and how they represent themselves. This “experiencedistant” research contrasts with the social-constructionist preference for the “experiencenear” style (Geertz, 1983, p. 57), in which the fascination with representations that are unique, ambiguous, and infinitely nuanced often defeats any attempts at generalization. We work between these two poles, seeking to find what can integrate the two for a more fertile understanding of social relationships.